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Abstract
The study of language evolution has benefitted enormously from the con-
tribution made by computational simulations of the cultural transmission
of language over the past ten years. However, we still have not explored or
confirmed these findings empirically in a human population. This thesis
presents a novel experimental method for investigating the emergence and
cultural transmission of language under controlled laboratory settings.
By integrating techniques from the modelling of iterated learning, with
techniques used to investigate language acquisition via artificial language
learning, a suitable empirical framework is created, opening up new av-
enues of research for understanding human language and culture.
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The central question that any researcher on human language must ask is
surely this: Why is language the way it is, and not some other way? Much
is made of the fact that no other species on the planet has a communica-
tion system as complex and expressive as ours, and yet it is easy to take
language for granted. As infants, we acquire it effortlessly. As competent
speakers, we use it constantly. Even our private thoughts seem intrinsi-
cally shaped and enhanced by our unique system of symbolic commu-
nication, if only to the extent that some complex concepts and modes of
reasoning can only be acquired through linguistic communion with oth-
ers (Carruthers and Boucher, 1998).
Part of an adequate answer to this why-question is going to come from
understanding how language came to be the way it is in the first place. In
other words, from understanding how and why language evolved in our
species and no other. However, the study of language evolution imme-
diately presents us with a major problem, in that the phenomena that we
wish to study is not actually visible to us (Christiansen and Kirby, 2003b).
That is not to say that there is no evidence for linguistic evolution; we are
surrounded by the evolutionary end-points of the process in the form of
modern human languages. What we lack however, is an uninterrupted
line of data that goes back to the incipient languages possibly spoken by
our early hominid ancestors. Attempts to reconstruct language can only
go so far (Fox, 1995), and as Hauser and Fitch (2003, p.158) point out, “lin-
guistic behaviour leaves no fossils, and many characteristics of language
appear unique to our species.”
Properties of Language
A more fruitful way to proceed might be to take a closer look at the prop-
erties of modern language and discover if they can tell us more about how
language evolution works. The first thing to note is that language exists
1
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at the intersection of three complex adaptive systems (as shown in Figure
1.1), each of which operates over a different timescale (Kirby and Hurford,
2002; Christiansen and Kirby, 2003a).
At one level, language is simply a system that is acquired by an indi-
vidual over the course of that individuals’ lifetime. At another level, we
can see it as a developing organism in its own right, changing over the
lifetime of the language. What the individual has learnt will influences
the structure of the language itself, and hence what gets transmitted to be
learnt by the next generation. Finally, the way that language is acquired
will depend in part by the learning biases that have evolved biologically
over the lifetime of the species as a whole. These innate learning biases
will have in turn been fine-tuned as a consequence of the language struc-
ture, in order to better learn it. Thus each of these systems interacts with
one another in non-trivial ways.
Figure 1.1: Language as a series of complex dynamic systems: this shows
some of the ways in which these systems interact. (Taken from Chris-
tiansen and Kirby (2003a), with permission)
.
Cultural Transmission
We can describe the processes of how language is acquired by an indi-
vidual (Bates et al., 2003), or how a biological trait can emerge via the
process of Darwinian natural selection (Jablonka and Lamb, 2005) with
a reasonable degree of accuracy – but considerably less is known about
cultural transmission of language, or in fact, cultural evolution in gen-
eral. In a recent paper, Mesoudi et al. (2006b) point out that if we com-
pare the progress made in understanding biological evolution since Dar-
win’s theory of natural selection was developed (Darwin, 1859) with the
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progress made in understanding cultural evolution, the study of culture is
substantially lagging behind. This is unfortunate considering the mount-
ing evidence that has been accumulated over recent years concerning the
key role that culture plays in determining human cognition and behaviour
(Tomasello, 1999; Richerson and Boyd, 2005).
As an example, let us consider what is actually meant by the term ‘cul-
tural evolution’ According to Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981, p.7), the
term ‘cultural’ should be applied to “traits that are learned by any process
of nongenetic transmission, whether by imprinting, conditioning, obser-
vation, imitation, or as a result of direct teaching.” This clearly describes a
wide and multi-faceted set of behaviours, all of which would benefit from
a more thorough examination of the mechanisms giving rise to it.
Iterated Learning
In this paper I concentrate on just one type of non-genetic transmission
process: observation. Language is not acquired by direct teaching1, and
nor is it learnt via imitation or conditioning as Behaviourists like Skinner
(1957) once thought. Put simply, people learn their language by observing
the linguistic actions of others. In this sense, language is a special kind of
learning problem, where the output of one generation becomes the input
for the next. This is better known in the literature on language evolution
as iterated learning (Kirby and Hurford, 2002).
Most of what we know about iterated learning comes from computa-
tional models of human communication, where it has been shown to in-
dependently explain the emergence of universal features of syntax, such
as compositionality (Kirby, 2000) or regularity (Kirby, 2001), without any
simulation of biological evolution taking place. However, models are not
perfect – their utility lies in the way that they can abstract away from the
complexity of their subject matter (Cooper, 2002; Hurford, 2005). This has
lead to some people arguing that real human populations would not act
the same way as the model, that in general most simulations of language
evolution contain “unrealistic initial conditions” which artificially limits
the problem space, and makes the models work (Bickerton, 2003, p.86).
Up until now, there has been no empirical framework available in or-
der to investigate whether this is true or not. However, if we look to the
field of social psychology, there is an extant methodology that shares a
1I am of course referring only to a person’s native language here – most people will be
familiar with the idea of being explicitly taught a second language, although they may
also be familiar with the all too common negative result that often accompanies it.
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lot of similarity with the modelling of iterated learning: namely the serial
transmission chain method devised by Bartlett (1932). In these experiments,
information – usually contained as a written text – is given to a participant,
who is then asked to recall it at a later time. This recalled version is then
passed to the next participant and the process repeats itself, to form a chain
of participants2.
Traditionally this method has been used to investigate such things as
how information (already encoded in natural language) changes accord-
ing to some mental schema (Bartlett, 1932), social bias (Mesoudi et al.,
2006a) or gender stereotypes (Bangerter, 2000; Kashima, 2000). The ba-
sic technique has also been modified in the past to look at such things as
the convergence of a shared graphical representation scheme in humans
(Fay et al., 2004), and even adapted to investigate the cultural conformity
and spread of novel tool use in chimpanzees (Whiten et al., 2005).
I believe that with some further modifications these transmission chains
can be adapted again to investigate how linguistic systems might arise in
a human population; essentially implementing a human iterated learning
model. This has the potential to offer a unique and novel empirical insight
into the processes of language evolution, with the option of extending the
paradigm to investigate other (non-linguistic) forms of cultural evolution
that are transmitted via iterated learning.
Focus of the Current Paper
This thesis presents a novel experimental method for investigating the
emergence and cultural transmission of language by using a series of arti-
ficial ‘alien’ languages that are learned and transmitted by human subjects
over successive generations in the laboratory. The preliminary findings
emerging from this new line of research will be analyzed in the context of
the existing literature and results from computational simulations using
the same parameters. In particular, it aims to show that the key finding to
have emerged from the existing models – that languages evolve to become
more learnable by their users – is upheld in a human population.
Road-map
It will begin in chapter 2 by exploring two different types of current lit-
erature that each contribute to the question of how language got to be
structured the way it is: computational modelling of language evolution,
2This is just like in the game Chinese Whispers or Broken Telephone – see http:
//en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese whispersforhowtoplay.
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and empirical experimentation. In particular, it will present a thorough
overview of the iterated learning model, before looking closely at recent
work by Galantucci (2005) and Hudson-Kam and Newport (2005) – who
present important new empirical work on the emergence of human com-
munication systems and regularization in creole formation respectively.
Additionally, work on social learning in primates will be touched upon, as
it affords a unique insight into what an empirical framework for analyzing
culture in humans might look like.
A new methodology which incorporates elements from all these areas
will be outlined and justified in chapter 3, whilst chapter 4 will explore
a series of experiments, the aim of which is to investigate some of the
main predictions concerning when we can expect structure to emerge in
language based on the computational simulations already discussed. Six
studies will be detailed in total, before in chapter 5, a fuller discussion of
the general implications of the data is explored. Finally, the thesis will be
brought to a close with the inclusion of some proposals for extensions and
future research.
CHAPTER 2
The Story So Far
2.1 The Iterated Learning Model
The main aim of developing the iterated learning model (ILM) was to ex-
plore the interaction that takes place between two distinct forms of linguis-
tic representation (Kirby and Hurford, 2002): E-Language and I-Language
(Chomsky, 1986). E-Language is basically the language that is externally
represented to the world – the set of actual utterances. I-Language refers
to the internalized representation of the language – stored in the brain as a
pattern of neural connections. In order to get to I-Language from observ-
ing E-Language, people (or computational agents) must have some way of
inducing a grammar based on what they have seen. Similarly, in getting to
E-Language from I-Language, people and agents must have some method
of production that does the converse (Hurford, 2002).
Figure 2.1: Transmission of I-Language to E-Language: as language is
transformed between these two different forms of linguistic representation
it is forced through a bottleneck. (Taken from Kirby (2001) with permis-
sion.)
2.1.1 Structure of the ILM
Just four components are required to implement an ILM:
6
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• One or more learning agents;
• One or more adult teaching agents;
• A meaning space;
• A signal space
The task of the agents is to acquire a mapping between meanings and
signals. The adult teaching agent has a random set of meanings that it
must produce signals for. Usually the adults do not actually have a lan-
guage system pre-specified at the start of the simulation, and so need to
be provided with the ability to create an utterance string either by ran-
dom invention, or by generalization from existing rules describing whole
or partly ‘known’ meanings.
A typical simulation proceeds as follows:
1. An adult agent chooses a set of meanings to utter at random
2. Based on this set of meaning-signal pairs, the learner agent develops
its own representation of the data.
3. After some specified amount of training (exposure to meaning-signal
pairs) the learner becomes an adult, and the process repeats with a
new learner.
There are a number of parameters in these models that can be varied:
the size and structure of the meaning-space (Batali, 1998; Kirby, 2002a,b;
Teal and Taylor, 2000; Zuidema, 2003); the production and induction mech-
anisms (Batali, 1998; Kirby, 2000; Tonkes and Wiles, 2002; Brighton, 2002);
the population dynamics and structure (Smith and Hurford, 2003), etc.
Perhaps the most fundamental parameter however is the bottleneck.
2.1.2 The Role of the Bottleneck
Every time E-Language is transformed into I-Language (i.e. every time
language is acquired by anyone) a kind of filtering process takes place.
As Deacon (1997, 110) explains: “The structure of a language is under in-
tense selection because in its reproduction from generation to generation,
it must pass through a narrow bottleneck: children’s minds.” Essentially
what this is saying is that in order for a structure to survive the transmis-
sion process and become part of the I-Language, it must be learnable.
There are at least two ways in which a structure can increase its chances
of survival and become more learnable. Firstly it could become more gen-
eralizable. One of the ways in which language can do this is by becoming
compositional – structured in such a way that the meaning of the whole is
composed of the meaning of its constituent parts and the way they are put
CHAPTER 2. THE STORY SO FAR 8
together. In fact, this type of structure is one of the hallmarks of human
syntax. Studies using the ILM explain the emergence of compositionality
by virtue of the fact that a compositional element can appear in multiple
different contexts, and thus maximize its chance of being learnt from the
E-Language (Kirby, 2000).
The second way in which a structure can survive the transmission bot-
tleneck is to just ensure that it is used frequently enough to make it likely
to appear. This explains why it is that the ten most frequent verbs in Eng-
lish are all irregular (Francis and Kucera, 1982). They can afford to be,
since they are used so often that it is guaranteed that a child will hear it
and remember it in spite of it not fitting the regular pattern (Kirby, 2001).
None of these results emerge in the models without the bottleneck being
present. Furthermore, if there is no bottleneck (i.e. agents hear every sin-
gle utterance in the language of the previous generation), compositionality
will not emerge as the entire system can just be memorized. Conversely,
if the bottleneck is too tight and only a few utterances get transmitted, the
language will not be stable between generations.
2.2 Experimental Studies of Human Communication
So far, the picture we are building of language is one where the cultural
transmission mechanism plays a central role in explaining the emergence
of certain types of linguistic structure – creating selection pressures for
language itself to evolve to become learnable by its human users. As such,
we should be able to test this hypothesis experimentally.
2.2.1 The Artificial Language Learning Task
Christiansen (2000) suggested that one of the ways to do this is to use
the Artificial Language Learning (ALL) paradigm. ALL has been used by
researchers investigating language acquisition and the statistical learning
abilities of humans (Saffran et al., 1996; Saffran, 2001) and non-humans
(Fitch and Hauser, 2004)) for a number of year. Essentially it involves
constructing a miniature artificial language with some desirable structural
properties that we wish to investigate, training subjects on that language,
and then testing them to see what they have acquired.
Building from computational modelling work that suggested word or-
der universals in language come about because of language evolving to fit
human sequential learning and processing constraints (Christiansen and
Devlin, 1997), Christiansen (2000) devised two artificial languages that
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were either consistent or inconsistent with respect to the position of the
head of a phrase in a sentence. The model predicted that the reason we do
not naturally find languages with head-order inconsistency in the world
is because they are too hard for us to learn. Results from the ALL exper-
iment confirmed this, as subjects’ performances were significantly worse
on the inconsistent languages. An ALL task was also used to confirm sim-
ilar modelling findings concerning the universal feature of subjacency in
language (see Ellefson and Christiansen (2000) for more details).
ALL studies have also been used to investigate language formation in
creoles – a type of contact language that emerges when speakers of multiple
languages need to communicate (Thomason, 2001). The emergence of cre-
ole languages (Bickerton, 1981), along with recent studies of the emergence
of a new sign-language found developing in the Nicaraguan deaf commu-
nity (Kegl, 1994) are some of the rare occasions when we can observe a
human communication system arise naturalistically. However, these nat-
uralistic studies do not provide us with the experimental control to test
our predictions.
Hudson-Kam and Newport (2005) used artificial languages to investi-
gate the different roles that adults and children are hypothesized to play
in creole formation. The phenomenon they chose to focus on was regu-
larization – in particular, they posed the question of how languages with
unpredictable variation (such as might be encountered in the early stages
of creolization) become regular. They created two artificial languages that
differed with regards to the presence or absence of a determiner within
noun phrases. In one language the determiner was consistently present
100% of the time. In the other, it was only present 60% of the time. They
taught both languages to a group of adults, and to a group of children
between the ages of five and seven.
They used a series of tests designed to elicit both grammaticality judge-
ments and production data in order to infer what the two groups had
learnt based on their training, and found no significant difference between
the performance of the adults and the children in the consistent group. In
the inconsistent group however, they found a difference in that only the
children regularized the inconsistent input. In other words they actively
imposed a systematic pattern on the input to make it consistent. The way
in which they did this varied from child to child – some left out determin-
ers altogether, some included them at every opportunity, and one child
only used a determiner with nouns in transitive sentences (Hudson-Kam
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and Newport, 2005). In contrast, the adult learners reproduced the incon-
sistency that they had heard.
Hudson-Kam and Newport infer from this that children play a crucial
role in the formation of new languages: not necessarily ‘inventing’ it, but
more likely acting to “regularize and stabilize the grammar of an emerging
language” (p.185). This is perhaps not surprising considering the empha-
sis that the ILM places on the vertical transmission going from parent to
child, as it is what the child is capable of learning, not the adult, that im-
poses the bottleneck on transmission1.
2.2.2 Galantucci’s Video Game Task
For a great many years, it has been assumed that studies such as those
already outlined would be the closest we could ever come to empirically
investigating the emergence of language. A paper by Galantucci (2005)
has changed all that. In it, he describes an experimental study where pairs
of subjects play a simple video game together. Each subject controls an
agent that is situated within a virtual environment, initially composed of
four rooms, each of which is uniquely identified by a shape in the center.
The players’ task is a simple one – to get their agents into the same room by
making no more than one room change each. In order to do this, they have
to somehow co-ordinate their movements. But there is a catch. Neither
player can see the other player’s agent until they are in the same room as
one another, and the two players are prevented from communicating with
one another using any language they know.
Instead they are given a digitizer pad which is hooked up to a com-
puter upon which they may draw. On their computer screen they can
see the effect that writing on the digitizer pad has, and also see what the
other player draws. Again, here too there is a catch: the digitizer pad only
records movement in the horizontal plane. In place of freely independent
vertical motion, there is a constant downwardly scrolling motion, meaning
that a left-to-right horizontal motion on the pad renders itself a top-left to
bottom-right diagonal on the screen. This in effect prevents players from
writing any alphanumeric characters, or even drawing any iconic images.
However, in spite of these impediments, nine out of ten pairs managed to
solve the game in less than 3 hours. Furthermore, they did this by negoti-
ating a communication system together.
1Although the iterated learning model does not actually make any claims that the
learner actually has to be a child – just inexperienced with respect to the stimuli being
transmitted – as we will see in the later experiments all run on adult participants
CHAPTER 2. THE STORY SO FAR 11
By increasing the complexity of the environment (e.g. from 4 rooms
to 9), and changing the task (find and capture the prey) Galantucci was
able to demonstrate how these linguistic systems, once established, could
adapt in response to the new demands being placed upon it (Steels, 2006).
Whilst the resulting systems are difficult to analyse quantitatively due to
their graphical form, a number of striking features appear. Firstly, the re-
sulting systems are incredibly diverse, being based on either an arbitrary
numerical system, the icon in the centre of the room, or on the layout of the
game map. More interestingly, there was even indication that at least one
pair (pair 7) had stumbled upon a method of re-using the symbols they
created in the earlier games after the environment had expanded to 16
rooms, by coming up with a symbol meaning ‘below’ and a symbol mean-
ing ‘to the right of’. This combining together of different meanings into a
new meaning for the whole is surely reminiscent of compositionality.
2.3 Experimental Studies of Social Learning in Primates
Clearly language is not the only skill that is culturally transmitted via ob-
servation. Much work in comparative biology has been focused on ex-
ploring the role of social learning in animal behaviour. The majority of
this work has been focused on primates2, trying to characterize the extent
to which they resemble us culturally (Caldwell and Whiten, 2004; Whiten,
2005).
A lot of debate has gone into whether non-human primates can learn
by imitating others, or by emulating others. Both involve observation and
learning of new behaviours, but whereas imitation involves ‘learning to
do an act from seeing it done’, emulation involves ‘attending to the end-
result in the environment’ (Tomasello, 1998, p.704): not necessarily doing
it the way it has been seen, but achieving the same environmental effect
in the end. In order to try to distinguish between these two closely related
types of observational learning, a series of experiments were devised that
involved manipulating an ‘artificial fruit’ (Whiten et al., 1996; Caldwell
and Whiten, 2004; Custance et al., 2001).
These experiments are of interest to us here as they explicitly attempt
to observe how the skill (in this case, opening the fruit) has been transmit-
ted from a demonstrator to an individual. The artificial fruit itself consists
2although see (Rendell and Whitehead, 2005) for a review of recent findings studying
cetacean culture
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of a box containing food that can be opened in one of two ways – by ei-
ther pushing or twisting a bolt, opening a barrel latch by turning a pin and
turning a handle, or opening a barrel latch by twisting a pin and pulling
a handle. The different ways of opening the fruit can be seen as different
learned cultural variants – even though all three methods could be dis-
covered by a primate interacting with the box individually, if they only
performed the variant that they were shown, we can be reasonably confi-
dent that this is because they have learnt this during the observation. All
in all, the experiment was performed on eight different primate species
(including human children).
Researchers have also managed to perform some similar larger scale
studies in the field – for instance, introducing a new kind of nut to wild
chimpanzees and observing the way in which the new nut-cracking tech-
nique that is required is eventually taken up by the group (Biro et al., 2003).
These are perhaps even more interesting for the purposes of our discussion
as they actively involve observing how the skill is transmitted through the
group, rather than one-to-one.
Whiten et al. (2005) recently performed a more controlled experiment
to investigate the cultural transmission of a novel tool within three differ-
ent groups of captive chimpanzees. Each of the three groups was exposed
to a new foraging task. In two of the groups, a high-ranking female was
trained one-on-one with a human demonstrator on how to use the tool to
get food from a ‘pan-pipes’ device in one of two possible ways: either by
poking it with a stick, or lifting a catch with a stick. The third group acted
as a control, and no expert was trained. The idea behind the experiment
was to observe how different cultural variants of the task (poke and lift)
would spread in the community when it was openly diffused like this,
making it an interesting contrast with the direction of cultural transmis-
sion in the iterated learning model.
Instead of controlling it so that the expert teaches each chimpanzee in
the group in turn (as would likely happen in the ILM), the entire group
was allowed to observe their local expert obtaining food via the method
over a seven day period, whilst the number of demonstrations each in-
dividual chimpanzee paid attention to was noted. During this time, the
other group members could not access the pan-pipes. The task was then
made available to all the chimps in the group over an additional ten-day
period, and all attempts at performing the task were recorded. Firstly, 30
out of the 32 chimps in the experimental conditions managed to master the
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task – an impressive feat in itself. Secondly, although some chimps from
both groups independently discovered the alternative method, the signifi-
cant majority went on to conform to the ‘normal’ behaviour of their fellow
group-members. The control group in contrast, despite intense interest in
the task, failed to gain any food.
CHAPTER 3
The Missing Framework
3.1 Why the World Needs Alien Languages
We can summarize the preceding discussion as follows:
• Work on computational modelling suggests to us that language evolves
to become learnable because of the way in which it is transmitted to
users over generations (Kirby and Hurford, 2002);
• This theory gets some support from empirical studies investigating
artificial languages (Christiansen, 2000; Christiansen and Ellefson,
2002);
• Further investigations of artificial languages show that children and
adults may play different roles in regularizing languages (Hudson-
Kam and Newport, 2005);
• Galantucci (2005) offers us an empirical way to investigate how com-
munication systems emerge between pairs of speakers;
• Finally, we have looked at some studies that can show how a cultural
trait such as foraging is transmitted through a population of non-
human primates (Caldwell and Whiten, 2004; Whiten et al., 2005).
The question to pose now is, what does this all mean for the study
of language evolution, and culture in general? The study by Galantucci
(2005) shows us how languages can arise through negotiation in order to
solve a specific task, but there is no attempt made here to investigate how
that language may be transmitted beyond the pair (although this is cer-
tainly a topic for further research). Perhaps the most important contribu-
tion the work makes however is in showing that, against all expectations,
it is possible to investigate language emergence in the laboratory.
The work being undertaken on diffusion chains in chimps is clearly
more orientated toward exploring the transmission side, although it is not
focused on language evolution. In addition, the cultural traits that have
been explored using this method have all so far existed as simple binary
14
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variants – the box is opened by the bolt or the barrel latch; the food is
obtained using the poke or the lift technique etc. – and as convincing a case
as has been made for non-human primates having a rich cultural life and
history (Whiten, 2005), there are limits to what a comparative approach
can tell us about our own species1.
Essentially we must conclude that there is still not a proper frame-
work within which to examine how more complex cultural traits (such as
language) emerge and are culturally transmitted. This is significant, not
least because of the fact that there are many competing theories out there
that would benefit from data gathered within an empirical framework de-
signed to tap into the way in which complex nongenetic cultural traits are
transmitted (Dawkins, 1976; Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman, 1981; Dennett,
1995; Aunger, 2000). The solution I propose is to integrate elements from
all of the studies previously discussed in order to construct a new frame-
work. In order to be useful and go beyond what we already have, this
framework must have the following properties:
1. It must result in empirical data from human subjects being obtained
2. It must allow for experimental control and manipulation of variables
3. It must enable us to investigate a complex trait with many different
variants open to cultural selection
In addition, it would be desirable for this framework to be flexible
enough to allow us to explore the different modes of cultural transmission
that have been identified, such as horizontal (peer to peer) and vertical
(inter-generational) (Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman, 1981). To this end, a se-
ries of experiments were designed whereby artificial ‘alien’ language are
constructed and given to learners, whose responses are given to the next
learner, and so on. This simple idea, to essentially use techniques from
ALL to implement a human ILM, has to my knowledge never been done
before, despite having the potential to provide just the kind of framework
we need to address the important questions facing cultural theorists and
language evolution researchers.
The rest of this paper aims to test the viability of this suggestion by
examining what, if anything, it can show us about language evolution.
This will be done by attempting to confirm the main hypothesis to have
1Although it will still be very interesting to see what will be shown in the forthcoming
work by Horner et al. investigating this kind of transmission chain in children.
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emerged from the iterated learning of language, that language is an adap-
tive system in its own right that evolves to become learnable by its users.
3.2 Methodology
This section presents the methodology behind the studies discussed in the
rest of this paper.
Generalized Overview
Each experiment took place using a computer, and consisted of 3 main
steps repeated over ten generations of learners:
1. A subject is exposed to some sub-set of an artificial language consist-
ing of a series of pictures (corresponding to meanings) paired with
a string of letters (the signal). They are told that the string describes
the picture in an ‘alien’ language, and it is their job to learn this lan-
guage as best they can based on the pairings.
2. After this period of training, the subject is presented with a series of
pictures without strings, some of which will be pictures they have
encountered before during training, and some of which they will
never have seen before. Their task is now to provide the correct de-
scription for each picture.
3. These pictures and responses then become the new set of training
pairs for the next participant.
Participants were given both verbal and written instructions regarding
the structure of the experiment (see Appendix A) but were not told the ex-
perimental aims, nor that their results would be given as input to another
participant until after they completed the task. They were instructed to
always type in a response, even if they were not sure of it, in order to
“maintain good relations with the aliens”. In addition, they were fully
informed that they would undergo a series of three bouts of exposure to
the language, followed by three periods of testing with optional timed rest
periods. This was done both to break the task up for the participant and
to let them practise typing in a response. Only their final responses were
actually given to the next generation however.
It is important to note that there is no explicit training or instruction on
the language beyond the presentation of the meaning-signal pairs, and no
feedback was offered to the subjects by the experimenter during the task.
Thus each person must discover the language anew based solely on the
observed behaviour of the previous generation.
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Structure of Meaning Space
The pictures contained a series of differently coloured simple geometric
shapes, all engaged in some kind of movement activity. There were 27
of these ‘meanings’ in total, with three features along each dimension, as






Table 3.1: Table showing the meaning-space structure used in all lan-
guages, with an example on either side.
Structure of Initial Alien Language
One of the key things Galantucci (2005) contributes in his experiment is the
communication medium that ensure his subjects create an entirely novel
language from scratch (Steels, 2006). Obviously, with a methodology as I
have laid out here, an initial alien language of some sort is required for the
very first person to learn. I propose to do this by giving the first learner a
totally randomly constructed language. The initial languages were com-
posed of nine syllables drawn from a set of forty, and then concatenated
(with replacement) to form strings between 2 and 4 syllables long. These
were then assigned arbitrarily to each of the 27 meanings. There are two
reasons for doing this. Firstly, this is often how languages start off in the
modelling research2.
Secondly, I would argue that starting the languages off in this way is
not so different from the way that creole languages often start from more
simplistic pidgin languages. It is often said that a pidgin is no-ones native
language; it clearly contains a blending or borrowing of extant structure
from other languages, and yet it often becomes the point of departure for
a fully fledged creole, whose eventual structure is almost unrecognizable
based on its humble beginnings (Thomason, 2001). Thus, if anything, the
2This is a slight exaggeration – although the net result is a random language, more
typically the models get the agent to produce this language themselves by using random
invention. This is not a viable option in this case as it is hard to say what subjects would
do if asked to produce a ‘random language’. Maybe this is a topic for further investiga-
tion.
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complete lack of structure initially should make it harder for subjects to
find structure upon which to build a new language, not easier.
Participants
80 subjects (34 male, 46 female, mean age = 23;10, s.d. = 6;1) were re-
cruited in total; 20 for two pilot studies, and a further 60 for the main
study. Participants were deemed ineligible to take part if they: a) had stud-
ied linguistics beyond first year at University level3 or b) suffered from
dyslexia. There were no restrictions placed on the native-language of the
subjects, although the majority of participants were native English speak-
ers (73.75%), and all subjects reported themselves as being either compe-
tent or fluent in English. They were all paid the sum of £5 for their partic-
ipation, and randomly allocated into one of the 8 language families based
on when they were available to take part in the experiment.
Pilot Studies
Two pilot studies were performed with the objectives of a) refining the
methodology to improve conditions for subjects, and b) ensure that suffi-
cient data was collected to address the main hypothesis. Of most immedi-
ate concern was the fact that most ALL studies spend a great deal of time
training subjects. For example, Hudson-Kam and Newport (2005) trained
their subjects over six sessions of 10 to 20 minutes each, spread over 9 days.
Due to the fact that we were getting our training data from the output of
previous participants however, a similar regime was impossible to imple-
ment here – in this time-scale, and provided there were no drop-outs by
participants, each language family would take three months to complete.
With that in mind, it was decided that each experiment should last no
longer than an hour. It was therefore important to know how much of the
language could be acquired in this time.
Following the first pilot study, the decision was made to collect signals
for all 27 meanings on the last test, instead of just those that were to be
given to the next generation. This was done because in calculating inter-
generational accuracy scores, we were often comparing a word created
in generation 10 with a word last uttered in generation 4, which seemed
no longer representative of the language that generation 10 had built up
3These restrictions were put into place as a precaution only, as it was felt that these
people would be tempted to analyse the task in a different way to the general public.
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since. This did increase the amount of time spent testing, although post-
test questionnaires performed on subjects exposed to this longer test con-
dition did not highlight it as a concern. Interestingly enough the vast ma-
jority of the participants (17 out of 20) reported that they were unaware
that they were being tested on items that they had not seen. Most im-
portantly overall however, subjects levels of recall for the seen items sug-
gested that they were all capable of learning the language in the time they
were exposed to it, and although the task was uniformly felt to be ‘diffi-
cult’, subjects agreed that it got easier by the third round of training, and
even reported that the task was enjoyable.
Procedure
Two basic conditions were initially identified, based on the notion of the
size of the bottleneck:
• In the 50% condition subjects were trained on 14 meaning-signals
drawn randomly from the language. These 14 items were called the
seen set, and the 13 remaining items were called the unseen set. Dur-
ing the test phases, they were tested on seven meanings from the
seen set and a further seven from the unseen set - both of which
were sampled randomly. In the final testing run, the extra 13 items
(7 seen, 6 unseen) were tested on directly after the usual test-set. This
was done to ensure that any influences of fatigue would not directly
affect the language composition to be presented to the next genera-
tion.
• In the 75% condition the same basic procedure was followed, only
this time the subject was trained on 20 meaning-signals which formed
the seen set. During testing, they were given the entire contents of
the unseen set (7 items) plus 13 items sampled randomly from the
seen set, with a final test set which includes the remaining 7 unseen
items.
Exposure to the stimuli was timed using a computer: each meaning-
signal pair appeared for exactly six seconds, with the signal preceding the
meaning by one second4. Each meaning-signal pair in the training (seen)
set was randomized and given to the participant twice before a test and a
break. This break was optional but was timed to ensure it was no longer
4This was done in part to share parsimony with the order of events in the ILM, but
also as a result of a post-test questionnaire following the first pilot.
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than two minutes. The exact schedule for both sets of experimental condi-
tions is as follows:
• Training on seen set (x2)
• Test
• Break
• Training on seen set (x2)
• Test
• Break
• Training on seen set (x2)
• Extended Test (of entire language)
• End
CHAPTER 4
The Human Iterated Learning Model
This chapter describes the results of running the human iterated learning
model. In order to uphold the central hypothesis that language evolves to
become learnable, it needs to be shown that not only does subjects’ per-
formance on the seen items increase, but also their performance on the
unseen items. In order to do this we need to operationalize some mea-
sure of performance. Additionally, it might be useful to have some way of
describing the structure of the language itself in quantitative terms.
Subject Performance on Language
The performance of each subject was judged by comparing their language
with the language spoken by the previous generation – in other words, by
measuring how faithfully the subject was able to reproduce their input. As
such, it can also be seen as a measure of language stability.
In order to calculate this inter-generational performance, we need to
start with some way to measure how similar two output strings are. As we
do not have any control of the strings that a subject will output, this simi-
larity measure must be tolerant to variations in the lengths of both strings,
and so Levenshtein Distance (Levenshtein, 1966) was selected. The way
it works is by calculating the minimum number of insertions, deletions
or substitutions required to turn one string into another. For example, if
we were to try to turn the string ‘nanimi’ into ‘hanim’ we would have to
make one substitution (‘n’ to ‘h’) and one deletion (‘i’ to ‘0/’), resulting in a
distance of 2. In order to make useful comparisons with this figure how-
ever, we need to normalize it using Equation (4.1), where s1 and s2 are the
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Accordingly, identical strings score a value of 0, and maximally distinct
strings score a value of 1. These figures can be summed for every utterance
in the language, and then averaged to provide a single figure showing the
stability of the language/performance of the subject over the whole lan-
guage, or we can calculate performance on seen and unseen items inde-
pendently.
Language Structure
When we describe something as structured, we are saying that there is
something consistent and special about the way it is arranged. When we
talk of language being structured, we usually mean that there is some
regular relationship between a form and its corresponding meaning. In
a compositional system, this relationship can be described as structure-
or neighbourhood-preserving, reflecting the fact that neighbouring mean-
ings in the meaning space will map to neighbouring signals in the signal
space (see Kirby (2001) and Smith (2003) for more details).
One way to measure the amount of correlation between the relative
distances in the meaning and signal spaces (and hence discover if similar
signals map to similar meanings) is to examine the pairwise differences
between them. The equations in (4.2) and (4.3) define an estimate of lan-
guage structure over an entire language of n meaning(m)-signal(s) pairs.
To calculate E(O), the average Hamming and Levenshtein distances (HD
and LD shown in (4.3)) are required1. The average Levenshtein distance
uses every pair of meanings, excluding comparison against itself (i.e. n2−n
pairs), and an identical number of signal pairs for the Hamming distance,
hence the denominator of n(n − 1). E(O) is then simply Pearson’s corre-
lation coefficient with the summations used to calculate the mean differ-




























1The Hamming Distance is another string edit distance measure which works by cal-
culating the lowest number of substitutions required to transform one string into another.
As such, it requires the two string lengths to be equal, which for the meaning space in-
stantiated here, is the case.


















This should result in a value between 1 and 02. (Smith, 2003) argues
that a value of approximately 1 represents a fully compositional system,
whereas a value of approximately 0 represents a holistic system (one where
the meaning of the whole is not a function of the meaning of its parts). In
order to confirm that the random initial languages that were created by
the method described in section 3.2 are in fact holistic, 1,000 were gener-
ated and their language structure estimated. This resulted in a mean of
0.0006, and standard deviation of 0.04 – well within the expected range.
This shows us that the chances of us stumbling upon a compositional lan-
guage via the random generation process is vanishingly small.
4.1 Experiment 1: Random Initial Language
In this experiment two language families were created with different ini-
tial languages drawn at random. Family 1 were trained with a 50% bottle-
neck, whereas Family 2 had a 75% bottleneck.
4.1.1 Learnability Increase
To test whether the languages changed to become more learnable or not,
subjects’ performance on seen and unseen items was calculated (see Figure
4.1). In both bottleneck conditions the nLD of the seen items falls dramati-
cally over generations, eventually settling somewhere around zero. Exam-
ining the graphs of the unseen items, we can see that these also fall to zero,
although not as quickly nor as smoothly as for the seen items. In addition,
the language with the bigger bottleneck seems to stabilize faster than the
one with the smaller one. This shows several things: firstly, participants
who encounter the language at a later generation are finding it easier to
2Actually, the Pearson’s Correlation produces a number between 1 and -1, but it is
quite hard to visualise what a language with a negative correlation would look like. It
should be one where similar meanings are associated with dissimilar signals, and vice
versa.
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learn than those at earlier generations, and secondly, the bottleneck may























































Figure 4.1: Graphs showing performance on seen (left) and unseen (right)
items in family 1 and 2: the normalized levenshtein distance of both sets of
items falls over time, indicating the language is becoming easier to learn.
It is worth considering in more detail why it is that the subjects start
to perform better on the unseen items with time. If the language remains
random, we would expect this score to be uniformly poor across genera-
tions. The only way for a subject to ‘know’ what the correct description
is for a meaning they have not seen is to somehow infer it based on the
relationships between the meanings and signals that they have seen. If we
look more closely at the languages themselves (see Appendix B.3 and B.4)
it appears that this increase in language performance is happening at the
same time as a vast reduction in the number of distinct strings in the lan-
guages: although both language families start out with 27 distinct strings,
by generation 10 this figure has fallen to 5 in each case. This means that
the meanings are now underspecified with respect to the signals in the
language – instead of a one-to-one mapping, we have ambiguity.
4.1.2 Structured Ambiguity
Looking at the languages at the final generation however, it appears that
this ambiguity is not random. We find that we can describe the languages
in terms of rules. For example, in Family 1 everything that moves in a spi-
ral is called ‘poi’, and everything that moves in a horizontal line is called
‘tuge’. In addition to this, there is a three-way distinction for bouncing
shapes: ‘tupim’ refers to bouncing squares, ‘tupin’ to bouncing triangles,
and ‘miniku’ to bouncing circles (see table 4.1). A similar system appears
to be at work in family 2 (table 4.2), where the signals also seem to de-
scribe a maximum of two of the three dimensions of meaning. As one
CHAPTER 4. THE HUMAN ITERATED LEARNING MODEL 25
participant (Family 1, Generation 9) put it: “the aliens don’t seem to care
about colour”. For want of a better term, we will call this phenomenon
‘Structured Ambiguity’.
SQUARE CIRCLE TRIANGLE
SPIRAL poi poi poi
HORIZONTAL tuge tuge tuge
BOUNCE tupim miniku tupin
Table 4.1: Structured Ambiguity in Family 1: This table shows how the
5 words in the language are divided up in terms of motion and shape.
Colour is not reflected at all in this language.
BLACK RED BLUE
SQUARE horare honare honare
CIRCLE gomia gomina [gomina;horare]
TRIANGLE kakawa kakawa kakawa
Table 4.2: Structured Ambiguity in Family 2: This table shows how the 5
words in the language are divided up in terms of shape and colour. Motion
is not reflected at all in this language. Items in bold font indicate they
appeared with greater frequency.
As has already been mentioned, the number of signal types has fallen
dramatically in these languages. As this happens, there is conceivably
a possibility that the arrangement of signals to meanings could have oc-
curred by chance, based on simply replicating the various frequencies of
the seen items probabilistically. In order to prove otherwise, a montecarlo
test was performed3. The idea behind this test is to ask what a totally naive
agent, who had no access to the meanings, would do given the same data
that the human was trained on.
The agent is given the training data for the language at every genera-
tion, and then asked to produce the same number of utterances as the hu-
man. As it cannot make a decision based on the meanings, it selects a word
probabilistically from the training set based on their relative frequencies.
For example, imagine a training set consisting of just two different words,
A and B. Now imagine that A appeared in the training set 8 times, and B
only appeared twice. The naive agent would pick A 80% of the time, but
there is still a chance (20%) that it will pick B. Once it has picked the cor-
rect number of utterances, the nLD was calculated for the agent’s choice.
3The code for performing this test was graciously provided by Kenny Smith.
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This procedure was repeated 1000 times, and the 95% confidence interval
plotted as an error-bar, before being compared against the actual figures


























Naive Agent performance (family 1)


























Naive Agent performance (family 2)
Human performance (family 2)
Figure 4.2: Performance of Naive Agent on Family 1 and 2: from this graph
we can see that the human score is significantly different from that of the
naive agent, trained on the same data. This indicates that the humans are
inferring structure in the language.
We can see from this graph that whilst the human performance in-
creases over generations, the naive agent’s performance stay relatively sta-
ble. Every point where the human performance level is below one of the
naive agent’s error-bars represents a statistically significant difference in
the relative scores obtained (p<0.05). What this shows is that the humans
are definitely not following a similar strategy to the naive agent and just
uttering words based on their probabilistic frequencies (at least not at later
generations). They do better than the naive agent because they are guided
by some underlying structure between signals and meanings, one that al-
lows them to correctly infer a signal given a meaning, even in the absence
of training on that specific meaning.
4.1.3 Discussion of Experiment 1
The most important thing of note to emerge from the first experiment is
that we have confirmed the main learnability hypothesis from the compu-
tational simulations. The second thing of note was the way the languages
changed to bring this about. Instead of becoming structured via composi-
tional means, the languages became structured by underspecifying parts
of the meaning space. This is actually quite an exciting finding, especially
when we consider that it is a fairly well-established fact, both within and
without the modelling community, that language learners appear to have
a preferential bias towards having a one-to-one mapping between surface
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forms and underlying meanings (Slobin, 1977; Pinker, 1984; Markman and
Wachtel, 1988; Smith, 2003). Why then, would learners be over-riding this
natural instinct?
The interesting thing is that we find similar behaviour arising within
the ILM’s themselves. All of the many different computational instantia-
tions of the ILM make explicit attempts to encourage one-to-one mappings
to emerge (see Smith (2003) for a summary of the biases and methods
used). In the literature this is usually discussed in terms of homonymy
and synonymy4. As De Beule et al. (2006, p.467) explain:
“The challenge in constructing artificial communication sys-
tems is to avoid homonymy (having words that have more
than one meaning) and synonymy (having several words for
the same meaning). If a communication contains a too high de-
gree of homonymy or synonymy it can not be used effectively.”
When the computational simulations are run without any constraints
on producing distinct strings, they degenerate in a very similar way to
what we see here – the number of strings, even if initially high in the orig-
inal language, plummets and in most cases results in the model just pro-
ducing a single utterance (Cornish, 2005). The fact that the human subjects
do not let their language degenerate that far may be testament to the fact
that they are still under the influence of their endogenous biases.
One way to look at the problem is to see the effect that the ambiguity is
having on the actual task. We know that it is making the language easier
to learn, so presumably the underspecification is somehow adaptive. Both
family 1 and 2 become underspecified in the same way – by losing the abil-
ity to describe one dimension of their meaning space. This may not sound
like much stated in these terms, but in fact, what that does is reduce the
meaning space from 27 items to just 9. It is possible then, that the subjects
are actually finding the task too difficult, and this is one way of alleviating
the pressure of co-ordinating a complex meaning space. Of course, this is
4There is a reason why I have not just labelled the ambiguity found in this study as
either homonymy or synonymy – the two are notoriously difficult to distinguish (Lyons,
1995; Pinkal, 1995), and this instance is no exception. On the one hand a case could
be made for homonymy as we clearly have words such as ‘poi’ in Family 1 appearing
for many different meanings. If what is being suggested here is correct however, this
structured ambiguity is actually involving a reclassification of the meaning-space of the
language - hence it is perfectly correct that all these instances of ‘poi’ should be named
thusly, as they all refer to just one meaning: RED. If we gave the subject nine identical
pictures, we would expect to get nine identical answers. In this instance, we cannot be
sure that the subject is not interpreting the pictures as equivalent.
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not to say that this occurred as a result of a conscious decision by any sin-
gle participant. Once two identical words appear in the input to the next
language learner the trend is only going to persist and snowball.
In the light of this finding then, would it even be possible to maintain
a compositional system if one managed to emerge? And secondly, could a
compositional system emerge if similar steps were used as in the models
to curb ambiguity? These questions will both be addressed in the next two
experiments.
4.2 Experiment 2: Compositional Initial Language
In this experiment, another two language families were created with dif-
ferent initial languages that were designed to be compositional from the
outset. These languages were created by drawing nine syllables from
our set of 40, and arbitrarily assigning them to individual components of
meaning, as table 4.3 demonstrates for Family 4. In order to create a sen-
tence, these words had to be combined together according to a strict word
order – motion, followed by shape, followed by colour. This scheme was
deliberately chosen so as the verb (motion) appeared first in order to make
it operate differently compared to English.
SPIRAL lu TRIANGLE ki RED na
HORIZONTAL ka CIRCLE no BLUE ni
BOUNCE po SQUARE me BLACK we
Table 4.3: Initial Language for Family 4
Family 3 were trained with a 50% bottleneck, while Family 4 had a 75%
bottleneck.
4.2.1 Bottleneck Affects Maintenance of Compositionality
By plotting our measure of language structure over generations, and also
examining subjects’ performance on unseen items (Figure 4.3) we can see
that the two languages, although start off in an identical position, even-
tually end up being rather different. The compositional system of Family
3 starts off being fairly close to that of Family 4, but by generation 8 the
system is very close to being entirely random. In contrast, Family 4 (which
has the larger bottleneck) seems to retain a high degree of language struc-
ture throughout, dipping a little at generation 7, but eventually ending up
at a reasonably high figure of 0.8.
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This difference in behaviour continues with regards to the performance
on unseen items. In a compositional system, we would expect this value to
be quite low, reflecting the fact that it is not necessary to actually see every
item, just enough examples to be able to generalize the rules. This is what
we initially find in both languages, but whilst Family 3’s score increases (in
marked contrast to the eventual end-point of the families in Experiment 1 –
Figure 4.2), Family 4’s score remains comparatively lower, although there
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Figure 4.3: Graphs showing language structure (left) and performance on
unseen items (right) in family 3 and 4: here we can see that whilst family
4 maintains a high degree of language structure throughout generations,
family 3 does not. Additionally, the performance of subjects in family 4 in
terms of unseen items is also better than that of family 3.
If we examine the languages in their final state (Appendix B.5 and B.6)
we can see that although the language structure score is not quite at 1 for
Family 4, the language does indeed show signs of compositional structure
(table 4.5), albeit with some errors. These errors were of a specific type, in
that the ‘syntax’ of the system was never compromised. All of the strings
produced would have been grammatical according to the language, but
just referring to a slightly different meaning. For example, ‘kasawe’ was
produced twice; once correctly to refer to horizontal-circle-black, but also
once to say spiral-circle-black.
In contrast to this, at generation 10, family 3 appears more chaotic (ta-
ble 4.4). There are some local rules that are apparent – such as a marked
similarity between BLUE and BLACK which contrasts with RED, or be-
tween red-squares and red-circles in contrast to red-triangles – but the
patterns are clearly not representative of the structured ambiguity previ-
ously described, nor are they compositional. This perhaps explains the
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fact that they are not capable of being transmitted faithfully between gen-
erations, as even if the seen items are memorable, the unseen items must
be invented anew by every generation.
BLACK BLUE RED
megopu megome haheki HORIZONTAL
CIRCLE megome megopu hahepu BOUNCE
magopu megopu haheto SPIRAL
magoho magohe hahepu HORIZONTAL
SQUARE magome magohe haheto BOUNCE
magomo magopu hahepu SPIRAL
megomo megoho wikipo HORIZONTAL
TRAINGLE megoho megohe wikipu BOUNCE
megoho megohe wikipu SPIRAL
Table 4.4: Analysis of language at generation 10 of Family 3. This table
shows that whilst there are a few regularities here, the language is largely
chaotic, with no systematic pattern accounting for the appearance of am-
biguous signals.
4.2.2 Compositional System Tolerates Change
As already mentioned, Family 4 maintains its compositional structure right
up until the final generation, although Figure 4.3 does show that there is
some amount of instability in this, centred around generation 7. If we
examine the language closer, we can see that this is because the ‘words’
comprising it have actually changed. It is still compositional, and is still
reminiscent of its initial form, but five of the nine syllables have been al-
tered (table 4.5).
SPIRAL la TRIANGLE ka RED na
HORIZONTAL ka CIRCLE sa BLUE ne
BOUNCE po SQUARE ma BLACK we
Table 4.5: Initial Language for Family 4
This happened gradually, but during the time characterized by fluctu-
ations shown in Figure 4.3. For instance, the word ‘no’ meaning CIRCLE
remained stable right up until generation 7, at which point there were four
different variants. The change over time for this one component is shown
in table 4.6. It is interesting to note that the introduction of the ‘sa’,‘so, and
‘se’ variants occur in spite of the subjects at no point seeing any syllable
CHAPTER 4. THE HUMAN ITERATED LEARNING MODEL 31
starting with an ‘s’. This kind of random innovation is typical, and seen in
every family.
Gen 6 Gen 7 Gen 8 Gen 9 Gen 10




Table 4.6: Competition amongst signal variants for CIRCLE in Family 3:
Item is bold were the most frequent. A possible reason for the shift from
‘no’ to ‘sa’ is that syllables beginning with ‘n’ stat to feature more promi-
nently at the ends of words, not medially.
We can speculate as to why ‘no’ lost its place in the language by exam-
ining the other syllables that begin with ‘n’ that feature in generation 7’s
response. In addition to ‘no’, we also find the syllable ‘ni’, ‘ne’ and ‘na’
all occurring at the end of the string, representing colour. In fact, from
Appendix B.6 we can calculate that the person at generation 8 saw 10 in-
stances of ‘nX’ at the end of a word, and only 4 instances of ‘nX’ medially.
Against this number of 4, they saw 3 instances of ‘sX’ medially in the con-
text of CIRCLE, but also an additional 2 times used ‘incorrectly’ against
other shapes. This could easily have led the person at generation 8 to form
some vague rules along the lines of sX is related to shapes and nX is related
to colour.
4.2.3 Discussion of Experiment 2
Here the main finding is that compositionality can be maintained by the
subjects, provided that the bottleneck is large enough. One major differ-
ence between the simulated ILM’s and the experiment is here there are
really two bottlenecks being imposed. The first is the one that we have
control over – what proportion of the language is seen by a subject. How-
ever, the additional bottleneck that I am speaking about concerns the sub-
jects own memory. Although nine syllables seems like a small number, it
was clear that the subjects taking part in this experiment found the task
a lot harder than subjects in the first experiment. This can be seen by ex-
amining the average response-time for each test item over the 4 families
studied so far (Figure 4.4).
This graph shows that whilst the time it took to respond to the sys-
tems with structured ambiguity fell, the system that maintains its degree
of compositionality, and the system that loses its compositionality pattern


























Figure 4.4: Graph showing average response time (ms) over all test items
in families 1-4. This shows a marked contrast between the response times
of families 1 and 2 at later generations, and the response times of families 3
and 4 at later generations. This indicates that learners of the initially com-
positional languages found learning those languages difficult throughout.
differently. It is perhaps conceivable that the reduction in response time is
in some way a reflection of the fact that the number of distinct items de-
creases in families 1 and 2. If this is the case however, then the relationship
is clearly not a straightforward one: if we look at the number of distinct
items in family 3, we find that at generation 6 it falls to just 4 – lower than
both family 1 and 2 – and yet the response time is much greater5. Ad-
ditionally, although it was often clear from a person’s responses (and the
verbal descriptions they provided at the end of the test) that they under-
stood the language, not a single subject in Family 4 managed to get 100%
accordance with the previous generation. Clearly formulating words in
the compositional language required a great deal of concentration. In this
case, having a larger bottleneck is helpful because the extra examples and
training it affords presumably make it easier to remember the elements
and the way they are put together.
Both this experiment and the preceding one seem to suggest that struc-
tured ambiguity is arising because it is an easier solution (or in other
5Of course, each data point here represents a single subject, and so differences should
be treated with caution.
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words, a better adaptation) to the pressures that the learning task is forc-
ing upon the subjects. It will be interesting then to see what occurs in the
next experiment when the ability to make the languages underspecified is
taken away from the subjects.
4.3 Experiment 3: Ambiguity Filtering
As already mentioned in section 4.1.3, computational simulations of iter-
ated learning have to impose certain biases in the agents in order to pre-
serve one-to-one mappings between meanings and signals. These have
been implemented in various ways – by penalizing or rewarding an agent
with costs for avoiding ambiguity (Batali, 2002), by using an architecture
that simply does not allow it (Hare and Elman, 1994; Batali, 1998; Kirby
and Hurford, 2002) or even only allowing the agent to learn from and re-
member the first example it sees of any given meaning-signal pair (Kirby,
2002a). This experiment involves attempting to enforce one-to-one map-
pings with the latter approach.
Obviously it is physically impossible to prevent a human subject from
learning from all and any examples it is given, but the methodology does
allow us to filter out any ambiguity before it even reaches the next genera-
tion. The way in which this was done was to examine the output from the
previous generation in order to identify instances where the same string
appeared for different pictures. If found, only the very first instance of the
string and the meaning associated it would be presented to the next gener-
ation, and the other meaning-signal pairs discarded; these items were not
replaced with alternatives.
Two families were created with random initial languages as before.
Family 5 were trained with a 50% bottleneck, and Family 6 with a 75%
bottleneck, although with the filtering in place, the actual size of the bottle-
necks fluctuated between individual generations depending on the num-
ber of ambiguities that were introduced by the previous subject. In any
case, the number of items requested in the test phase remained equiva-
lent to the bottleneck size. Whilst this did mean it was entirely possible to
be trained on fewer items than you were asked to reproduce, it avoided
getting to a situation where the subject was trained on just a single item.
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4.3.1 No Increase in Learnability
When we look at the performance on both seen and unseen items (Figure
4.5) we find the subjects in family 5 seem to do better than family 6. Al-
though nLD seems go down for both over time in the seen condition it still
remains much higher than the random initial languages in experiment 1.
Similarly, when we look at the performance on the unseen items, we see
that again, family 5 and 6 do poorly in comparison to languages in exper-
iment 1. Here however there seems to be a noticeable difference between
the families in the different bottleneck conditions: family 6 barely shows























































Figure 4.5: Performance on seen (left) and unseen (right) items for Family
5 and 6. Both families fail to show the same kind of performance improve-
ments over time as witnessed in earlier experiments. Family 6 in particular
does poorly in terms of unseen items, suggesting that this language is not
becoming easier to learn over generations.
This indicates that filtering out the ambiguity is preventing the lan-
guages from stabilizing. In a way, this is what we want in order to confirm
that the structured ambiguity in Experiment 1 is a positive adaptation, but
it is curious as to why there should be such a difference between the two
different bottlenecks. Family 5’s performance is at the very least, ques-
tionable, whereas Family 6 does not seem to be becoming easier to learn
over generations at all. We can examine what is going on in more detail
by looking at how our naive agent would perform on the same signal data
given to both families (Family 4.6).
This shows quite strikingly that, certainly for family 6, the subjects
and the naive agent appear to be doing the exact same thing – making
responses based probabilistically on the relative frequencies of the words
they have already seen. This is highly indicative of the fact that there is
no structured relationship between meanings and signals in this language


























Naive Agent performance (family 5)


























Naive Agent performance (family 6)
Human performance (family 6)
Figure 4.6: Performance of Naive Agent on Family 5 and 6: here family
6 is clearly doing no better than the naive agent on the same data. From
this we can infer that the human subjects are following the same strategy.
Interestingly enough, the score for the naive agent actually improves over
time for family 5, meaning that the strings in the language are evolving to
become more similar with time.
at all. Looking to family 5 however, it is interesting to note that the naive
agent itself seems to be doing slightly better at the language over time, al-
though still not quite to the same extent as the humans. What this seems
to suggest is that the language is changing in such a way as to make it
more likely to score well by just picking a seen item at random. This will
be discussed in more detail later.
4.3.2 Emergent Compositionality
In the models, this type of filtering process has been shown to facilitate
the emergence of compositionality. Given the negative results pertaining
to the learnability of the languages here, it seems unlikely that the sys-
tems have become compositional. In fact, examining the final states of
both languages, they clearly are not (Appendix B.7 and B.8). It is quite
difficult to describe them in terms of any of the systems we have already
discussed; they are most reminiscent of the chaotic system seen in Family
4. Nevertheless, running the estimate of language structure reveals that
whilst neither language attains full compositionality, it is not true to say
that there is no structure in the languages. In family 5 in particular, we see
two peaks – at generations 4 and 7 – that look like they may have indicated
structure was in the language at some point.
If we examine these in closer detail we discover a system that, whilst
not being fully compositional, at least bears the hallmarks of it. To explain,
the language at generation 4 is shown in table 4.7. Examining it, we can
clearly see that each string is broken into at least two parts. The endings


















Language Structure estimate (family 5)
Language Structure estimate (family 6)
Figure 4.7: Language Structure scores for Families 5 and 6: here we can see
that by the end of the experiment, both languages have very little structure
in them. There are two points in family 5 however that seem to indicate
that there was once structure present.
consistently refer to the motion aspect of the meaning: ‘-eko’ relates to
HORIZONTAL, ‘-kuki’ relates to BOUNCE, and ‘-kiko’ relates to SPIRAL.
The colour aspect is most clearly marked by the initial letter of the word:
‘w-’ for BLACK, ‘k/h-’ for BLUE, and ‘p-’ for RED. The shape aspect of the
meaning-space is less clear-cut, but one way of interpreting the data in ta-
ble 4.7 is to assume that rather than analyzing the meaning space fully into
it’s three constituent parts, this subject is making a division of labour such
that the first part of the word stands for an individual shape-colour combi-
nation. To illustrate this, there is consistent use of the morpheme ‘wine-’ to
refer to a black-circle, ‘kun-’ meaning blue-circle, ‘hun(e)-’ meaning blue-
square, and so on.
If we examine the data that this subject received from the previous gen-
eration (Appendix B.7) we can start to understand how this system may
have come about. Although generation 3 had a number of ways of refer-
ring to a BOUNCE item (wikiko, kunkuki, ponekuki, winikiko, hunekuki,
kunekuki, ponekiko), due to the random sampling of items, all of the items
that generation 4 saw had the ‘-kuki’ suffix. In the same way, all of the
HORIZONTAL items she saw had the ‘-eko’ suffix. The SPIRAL case was
a little different, as here the subject at generation 4 saw: wikiko, hunekiko,
kunekuki, wikuki, and poneki. Assuming that she had already decided
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BLACK BLUE RED
wuneko huneko puneko SQUARE
HORIZONTAL wineko kuneko poneko CIRCLE
wikeko kuneko poneko TRIANGLE
winukuki hunekuki punekuki SQUARE
BOUNCE winekuki kunkuki ponekuki CIRCLE
wikekuki kunekuki ponekuki TRIANGLE
winekiko hunekiko puniko SQUARE
SPIRAL winekiko kunkiko pokiko CIRCLE
wikiko kunekiko pokiko TRIANGLE
Table 4.7: Analysis of language at generation 4 of Family 5: this table
shows the ‘emergent’ compositionality that arose in the language. Words
are formed by a prefix indicating the shape and colour combination (e.g.
kun = blue-circle, wik(e) = black-triangle), and a regular suffix indicating
motion (e.g. -kuki = bounce).
that ‘-kuki’ meant BOUNCE, it would make sense for the suffix for SPI-
RAL to be the one that she saw most often6: ‘-kiko’.
Unfortunately, this ‘emergent’ compositionality never fully established
itself – although a similar system did appear later on at generation 7. This
could be due either to the specific properties of the language, or to do with
the fact that it unfortunately appeared in the 50% bottleneck condition,
which we already know may be less capable of maintaining a composi-
tional system.
4.3.3 Discussion
It was found that filtering out ambiguities that arose over successive gen-
erations seemed to prevent either language being learnable to the same
extent as witnessed previously. In particular, subjects learning the lan-
guage in Family 6 appear to have resorted to following a similar strat-
egy to the naive agent. However, two interesting observations were also
made. Firstly, the performance of the naive agent actually improved over
the course of Family 5, indicating that the language was changing to be
more easily learnt by probabilistic strategies. Secondly, two generations
within Family 5 seemed on the verge of constructing a compositional sys-
tem. This leaves us with potentially more questions than answers.
6Although there are many factors possibly influencing how salient a particular word
is to an individual subject – maybe something about the contrast between -eko, -kuki,
and -kiko simply appealed, or maybe it is due to which items she saw first or last during
training. All of these suggestions could be investigated further in future work using this
empirical framework.
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Thinking about what may have caused the increase in performance of
the naive agent, it seems likely that a candidate solution could be that the
words in the language are becoming more similar to one another. There
are several possible reasons for this. Firstly, we must remember that all
of the ambiguities are being filtered out in this experiment. This does not
actually stop individual participants from creating ambiguities, it just pre-
vents this from being the dominant trend.
Often people will, as a result of imperfect learning or a typo, acciden-
tally introduce a variant that is very close to the word that they were
actually aiming for. In an ordinary experiment, this variant will usually
be treated as noise if it does not exactly fit the dominant pattern7. How-
ever, in this run the noise accumulates and becomes significant; we start
to see many variants that differ from each other by just one or two let-
ters (e.g. From family 5, generation 10: ‘hunekiko’, ‘hunekike’, ’punikike’,
’punikiko’, ’punike’, ‘winike’, ‘wineke’ etc.). If this happens extensively
throughout the language then the naive strategy will start to do better on
the data, as picking any of the seen words should result in a fairly close
match to the target word.
The appearance of some kind of ‘nearly compositional’ system is a little
harder to explain. For one thing, it would appear that it could owe its
existence largely to chance factors, such as the fact that many words with
the same endings were seen. One of the advantages of this framework
however is that it allows us to retrospectively analyse interesting scenarios
such as these by exactly re-initializing the previous generation’s data at
the point of interest to see what multiple subjects make of it. If there is
an accordance in their collective actions (i.e. we repeatedly see emergent
compositionality) then we can conclude that this is more than just a ‘one-
off’.
7For an example of this see Appendix B.6, generations 1, 2, and 3: bouncing-black-
triangle (‘pokiwe’) is seen by generation 2 and incorrectly labelled ‘pokinwe’. This item
was then seen by generation 3, who promptly corrects the earlier mistake. This was not




The aims of this study were initially rather modest; it was hoped that the
framework might confirm that language itself adapts to become learnable
by its users, and in doing so, might justify the suggestion that it is a useful
tool with which to view language evolution, or any other complex cul-
turally transmitted trait learned by observation. This section examines
whether it has succeeded in its stated aims, and attempts to look more
closely at the issues the results raise, what problems the framework may
be usefully applied to, and ways in which the methodology may be im-
proved and extended.
5.1 Summary of Results
The results coming from the three experiments can be summarized as fol-
lows:
1. First and foremost, we can confirm the main experimental hypoth-
esis that language evolves to become learnable. This was shown by
the fact that languages at later generations were reproduced with
more consistency than those at the beginning, in terms of both the
seen and the unseen items.
2. The size of the bottleneck may affect the speed at which learners con-
verge on a stable language – a larger bottleneck encourages faster
stabilization.
3. The way in which languages evolved to become learnable was by
exhibiting structured ambiguity – a reduction in the dimensionality
of the meaning-space (hence a reduction in the overall number of
expressible meanings) occurring in a principled and regular way.
4. A compositional alien language could be initially acquired by sub-
jects.
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5. A compositional alien language could only be maintained in the larger
bottleneck condition however, as it requires more effort and concen-
tration on behalf of the learner, who benefits from the extra exposure
to the system they receive with the larger bottleneck.
6. A successfully maintained compositional system can tolerate some
degree of internal change and still remain compositional.
7. Preventing language from expressing structured ambiguity results
in the languages no longer becoming easily learnable.
8. In extreme cases (large bottleneck condition) this results in the sub-
jects adopting a naive probabilistic strategy.
9. In less extreme cases (small bottleneck condition) it results in the lan-
guage subtly changing so as to become easier to learn by probabilis-
tic techniques over time.
10. Two examples of ‘emergent’ compositionality were observed, but
could not be maintained.
It is clear from this summary that the study has proven more success-
ful than it was originally hoped. In particular, the result about the way
in which language becomes learnable over time has been a particular sur-
prise. The implications of this finding will be discussed below.
5.2 Ambiguity as Adaptation: Two Routes to Learnability?
Part of the interest in iterated learning stems from a desire to explain why
it is that language has the structure it does, hence there is a great deal of
focus in the literature into exploring how syntactic features like composi-
tionality emerge. As already discussed, the way that this is explained in an
iterated learning account is that it arises as a way of making the languages
easier to learn. Although it is understood in an abstract sense that there
is more than one way in which language may evolve to become learn-
able, the fact that compositionality is such a hallmark figure in natural
languages means that it very often takes centre stage in any discussion of
cultural transmission, learnability, and language evolution.
One of the key findings in this study however, is that compositional-
ity need not be the first port of call en route to learnability. This would
not be a surprise if it were to emerge in a model; as previous discussion
pointed out, models have to be ‘engineered’ in order to imitate known
biases present in humans concerning a tendency to preserve one-to-one
mappings between meanings and signals. The fact that it did emerge here,
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in an experiment involving humans who already possess such a bias, is
worthy of further investigation.
The first point we should make is that ambiguity is actually rife in nat-
ural languages, but relatively absent from formal languages (Wasow et al.,
2005; Hoefler, 2006). The reason for this is that ambiguity can lead to mis-
understanding, and has often thought to be a major hinderance to suc-
cessful communication (see earlier quote by De Beule et al. (2006) in 4.1.3).
Given this then, why is it that ambiguity is so prevalent? There has been
at least one study which attempts to answer this question by looking at
the phenomenon within the context of iterated learning. Using a modified
ILM Hoefler (2006) shows how syntactic ambiguity arises as an adapta-
tion, both caused and constrained by the transmission bottleneck. In the
model, the ambiguity plays a similar role to what we see in the experi-
ment1 – it increases the learnability of the languages, whilst at the same
time, stabilizing them.
By introducing ambiguity that reduced the meaning-space in a pre-
dictable and regular way, the language was able to be quickly and faith-
fully replicated between generations. We can view this another way, with
reference to Zipf’s Principle of Least Effort (1949). This argument con-
sists of a scenario where there are a finite number of m meanings to be
expressed. If a speaker is charged with expressing all of these meanings,
then the easiest solution for that speaker is to just utter a single signal
for all, as it saves the effort of encoding them individually. If however,
there exists a hearer whose job it is to interpret those signals and reassign
them to the original meanings, then it would be easier for the hearer if
there were m signals to work with, as it saves the effort of having to guess
which meaning the speaker is referring to. These two competing forces are
engaged in a trade-off, the solution to which lies in a compromise of some
number of words less than m but greater than one.
The study suggests that something along these lines is taking place.
It is important to realise however, that although the solution the subjects
settled on was a positive adaptation in the context of learning this alien
language, this would not be a good way of approaching a real language.
The strategy employed by the speakers in the experiment is optimal only
if there is no requirement to have to successfully decode the signals. This
1This is in spite of the fact that the ambiguity Hoefler discusses is syntactic, and the
ambiguity witnessed here is lexical
CHAPTER 5. GENERAL DISCUSSION 42
has several implications if we wish to study how language evolves to be
learnable via compositionality.
Firstly it suggests that encouraging compositionality to emerge is un-
likely to be successful by simply removing any evidence of ambiguity in
the input – indeed, this was confirmed empirically during the study. Sec-
ondly, it suggests a way in which it might be possible to encourage com-
positionality to emerge. The learning task as it currently stands means
that the subjects are playing a very passive role. The subjects are not re-
ally using the language to do anything with, and even if it doesn’t make
sense to them, they may be reluctant to ‘correct’ it because they’ve been
told to treat it as an existent language. In order for compositionality to
be a ‘better’ solution than structured ambiguity, the task may have to be
changed in such a way that the subject must both learn the strings asso-
ciated with meanings, and learn the meanings associated with strings. In
other words, we need to encourage our subjects to not only be able to pro-
duce the strings they have learnt, but also to effectively use the language
toward some communicative goal that they have a stake in.
5.3 Utility of the Framework
I have illustrated how this framework may be used to explore and confirm
findings based on simulation literature that is fairly well known. The fact
that it has shown us something new – that there is a potential ‘arms-race’
between compositionality and structured ambiguity over which will be
more successful depending on the task – is a positive sign that more work
needs to be undertaken in this area. However, it is impossible to evaluate
the utility of a novel methodology such as this without some consideration
of its limitations. This section discusses some things that would improve
the framework, and also looks at other potential areas within language
evolution which may benefit from empirical scrutiny. Finally, it considers
some basic extensions to the model.
Limitations
In striving to solve any problem it is often inevitable that new problems,
previously inconceived of, will often appear out of nowhere. One such
problem concerns the various measures available to interpret the data col-
lected from these studies. The current method by which string similarity
is calculated using Levenshtein Distance is not ideal. To understand why,
consider the following strings and Levenshtein distances in table 5.1. Here
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we have an instance of three different strings. Comparing the first two
strings, we find we get a highly value, reflecting the fact that there is very
little similarity between them. Looking at the second pair of strings how-
ever, we find that the Levenshtein distance algorithm assigns the same
value as the first pair, in spite of the fact that they are clearly more simi-
lar to one another, having been created by swapping around the syllables.
This may have adversely affected the scoring of some of Family 6, where
this type of syllable substitution occurred frequently.
string one string two levenshtein distance
hehima kuliza 4
hehima mahehi 4
Table 5.1: Illustration of the Levenshtein Problem: Here we have three
words with equal levenshtein distances, despite the fact that the lower
pair are simply a rearrangement of one another.
Another problem we have with the framework concerns the number of
subjects that are required. Because each language is a data-point, and not
each participant, this means that in order to perform regular statistical pro-
cedures upon the data, we need to have lots of different language families.
If you consider that each experiment run so far consists of ten generations
(and in fact, as I am about to argue, ten people is actually quite a small
number), we are talking about possibly hundreds of people required in
order to get enough data to perform statistics on.
This kind of situation is going to require creative solutions – in fact
we have already seen one such creative solution in the use of the Monte
Carlo Naive Agent, where we could maximize the data we had by com-
paring it against 1,000 algorithmic responses. A first step in addressing
this problem lies in calculating the actual extent of the variation in indi-
vidual’s responses. This could be done by simply taking a random lan-
guage and, from the same starting point, see where ten different families
take it. Isolating the interesting points in the language’s evolution can also
help direct where appropriate subject resources should be spent. Through
careful design and strict controls, the problem of participant numbers is
not insurmountable, although it is still an issue to bear in mind.
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Applications Within Language Evolution: An Example
Language evolution obviously did not happen overnight. Bickerton (1990)
argues that the development of modern human language occurred some-
where between Homo Erectus two million years ago, and the appearance of
anatomically modern Homo Sapiens around 200,000 years ago. In the inter-
vening time between, Bickerton proposes the existence of a protolanguage.
This begs the question of what this protolanguage may have looked like.
According to Bickerton (2005, p.8), it consisted of:
“a categorially complete, if severely limited vocabulary of items
roughly equivalent to modern words, but lacking a sophisti-
cated phonology and any consistent structure.”
This synthetic viewpoint can be contrasted with the analytic view of
Wray (2000), who maintains that protolanguage was originally a holistic
system, akin to primate calls. The debate gets especially heated when try-
ing to explain how compositionality emerged from these two very dif-
ferent starting points. For Wray, when the number of holophrastic ut-
terances got too large to handle, they start to get analysed into separate
constituents, and compositionality is born. For proponents of the syn-
thetic route, the transition from simple words expressing simple concepts
to complex arrangements of words expressing complex concepts would
have been triggered by some brain development (Bickerton, 2003).
Computational models have been built that provide evidence for both
routes (see (Hurford, 2000) for a synthetic account, and (Kirby, 2000) for
an analytic version). In a recent article, Bickerton (2005) comments on an
example given in Wray (2000) and quite rightly demands that proponents
of the analytic view answer the question of how signals could get decom-
posed if they appear in multiple contradictory contexts. The example that
Wray gave is of a language consisting of the following holophrases and
their meanings.
signal meaning
tebima give that to her
mupati give that to me
kumapi share this with her
pubatu help her
Table 5.2: Example Language taken from Wray (2000, p.294)
The analytic argument is that, given some data like this, there could
be chance matches between elements of the signal and elements of the
CHAPTER 5. GENERAL DISCUSSION 45
meaning (in this case, the constituent ma and some aspect of meaning cor-
relating to female person and beneficiary) which would lead the hearer to de-
compose the language. This account is sound, provided that there are no
counter-examples. If there are, Wray speculates that one of three types of
hypercorrection could occur and prevent a tentative hypothesis from be-
ing instantly rejected. However, without any robust data on how people
react to inconsistent and contradictory data, the argument is rather hard
to settle.
Of course, artificial language learning tasks have already been used
to investigate the way people interpret inconsistent data. The study by
Hudson-Kam and Newport (2005) discussed in the literature review ear-
lier, would maybe suggest that a child would regularize this system, but
that an adult would not. However, using a human iterated learning frame-
work may also provide a tool with which to investigate this phenomenon
and begin to address Bickerton’s query. As mentioned in the discussion in
4.3.3 we can use the framework to set up interesting scenario’s, such as the
one Wray presents, and see how multiple people interpret the data. We can
even go one further than a simple ALL task, and quantify the likelihood
of this random chance situation developing in the first place, or examin-
ing the future effect that starting off this process of analytic decomposition
will have2.
Extensions to the Framework
Right at the beginning of this study I said that one of the desirable proper-
ties of the framework would be to have the ability to explore other modes
of cultural transmission from within it. One type of extension to the model
would be to do this. The most obvious thing would be to explore both ver-
tical (‘parent to child‘) and horizontal (‘peer to peer’) transmission at once.
There are several different designs that could be chosen.
1. A simple way to incorporate both vertical and horizontal transmis-
sion is to perform the experiment in its original form, using the same
alien language as stimuli to a group of participants. At the end of
the experiment, all of the subjects responses are collected together
and randomly sampled from in order to create the new language.
2Note that if the language had evolved from the random initial conditions into a main-
tainable compositional language, this would have provided strong support for the ana-
lytic route. However, it is also possible to conceive of a method of training that might
encourage a synthetic system to emerge. The point however is that we do not know this
a priori but we possibly now have a means to test it.
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2. In a slightly more complicated version, two (or more) participants
would undergo some degree of training on the same alien language,
although in separate rooms. They would be told at the start of the
experiment that their task was to learn the alien language, but also,
that they must work with an unknown subject in order to co-ordinate
their answers to a variety of tests. They will be told ahead of time
that one of the tests will involve ‘guessing how the alien says X’, but
they will not actually get to see the alien term for ‘X’.
Instead, at the point where they would usually undergo the first test,
subject A will get a chance to select from a set of meaning pictures
one that s/he wants B to practise on. These pictures will all be ones
that they have not been trained on. Subject A will be able to see the
answer that B gives, but will not be able to communicate further.
Subject B is then also given an opportunity to select from a set of
pictures, and the process repeats for a while. The subjects will then
undergo more rounds of training, and practise together until the fi-
nal test, which as in this study, will consist of both seen and unseen
items, some of which will be given as the new input to the next gen-
eration of two (or more) participants.
Another way we can extend the experiments is to try to manipulate
the task in the way inspired by our discussion of Zipf (1949) earlier. This
could be done by simply alternating the testing procedure so that instead
of always asking for the description of the picture, it occasionally asked the
subject to identify the correct picture when prompted by the description.
It is important to remember that all of these possible extensions exist on
top of the fact that there are still many more parameters identified within
the modelling literature that have still not been explored. In particular,
the structure of the meaning-space and the number of generations would
seem likely to be good places to start working on. We have really only
seen a snap-shot of all the results that are waiting for us out there.
CHAPTER 6
Conclusion
This thesis has tried to address the question of why language is structured
the way it is, and not some other way. Clearly its current structure has
something to do with the way language is acquired, how we as a species
have biologically evolved, and crucially, how it is that language is trans-
mitted between speakers. This latter process is the focus of the current
paper. It was argued that we learn language by observing the external
linguistic actions of others (E-Language) and inducing our own internal
representations of it (I-Language). Every time language is transmitted to
a new speaker, the process of transforming language from two different
forms of representation (E to I) over generations forces language through
a learning bottleneck, creating selection pressures that favour structures
that can be generalized from, such as compositionality (Hurford, 2000).
So far, most of what we know about this phenomenon (known as it-
erated learning) comes from computational simulations (Kirby and Hur-
ford, 2002). Whilst this has taught us a great deal about the kinds of learn-
ing processes we should expect, what is really required are experimental
studies to confirm, and hopefully go beyond the predictions made by the
models. However, as yet there is no empirical framework through which
to examine a cultural trait as sophisticated and complex as language. A
novel methodology was presented here in order to redress this. A subject
is initially trained on a subset of a random ‘alien’ language consisting of
27 pictures (meanings), depicting differently coloured geometric shapes
engaged in motion, and strings (signals) that describe them. The subject
is then asked to reproduce data they have been trained on, but also, to re-
produce data that they have not seen before – thus recreating the learning
bottleneck under laboratory conditions.
In order to assess the viability of the framework, a series of six experi-
ments were performed, with ten generations of speakers involved in each.
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In the first language family, subjects were trained on an initially random
language using a 50% bottleneck (i.e., 50% of the data they were tested on
had already been seen during training). The experiment was contrasted
with a family trained on a similar language, but with a 75% bottleneck. It
was found that the size of the bottleneck was affecting the rate at which
languages became stable, but that languages in both instances evolved to
become more easily learnt. However, the way that it did so was not by
becoming compositional. Instead, the language became ambiguous with
respect to specific regions of the meaning space – for instance, by having
all bouncing items given the same word, regardless of the other meaning
dimensions. In order to reflect the fact that this was not a destructive or
random process, this phenomenon was called ‘structured ambiguity’.
What the appearance of structured ambiguity does is reduce the size of
the meaning-space in a predictable and reliable way, for instance, by con-
sistently not coding in a distinction based on colour. The learners’ task is
made easier both during word production (as identification of the mean-
ings is now based on fewer interacting variables), and word learning (as
the pattern is consistent and there are fewer words to learn). Four further
studies were performed in order to investigate whether a compositional
system could even be maintained, and also, to explore what happens to
languages that are prevented from exhibiting structured ambiguity.
These showed that compositionality could be maintained, and even be
robust enough to allow internal change, but only in a system with a larger
bottleneck. Additionally, when language was prevented from exhibiting
structured ambiguity, it was no longer learnable or stable. There are sev-
eral conclusions to be drawn from all this. Firstly, the compositional sys-
tems were harder to learn than the structured ambiguous ones, although
both systems led to language learnability and stability. Secondly, filtering
away ambiguity from the input to the learners is maybe not a sufficient
pressure in itself to tilt the balance towards favouring a compositional lan-
guage. For this to occur we may need to develop the framework slightly
to make the subjects less passive, and more realistically engaged in a task
that requires communication.
Overall, what has been discovered so far is highly promising, and cer-
tainly worthy of further analysis and study. Isolated examples of ‘emer-
gent’ compositionality were found during a run, which in itself is an en-
couraging sign that this is a framework naturally suited to exploring the
kinds of things we are interested in. Furthermore, what we learn about the
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way in which language is culturally transmitted will have widespread im-
plications for arenas beyond evolutionary linguistics – touching as it does
upon possible ways in which any cultural artifact is transmitted.
For too long, the field of language evolution has had to content itself
with the words “We can only speculate on...”, just because we simply have
not had the data to go on. Obviously this is not going to provide an an-
swer to every question, but in being able to control cultural transmission
in the laboratory, we have gone a step further than modelling such a com-
plex process. We now have a tool that can be used to re-assess much of
the previous work that has been undertaken, and a yardstick by which to
measure whether we have got an answer that comes anywhere near to the
truth revealed by the rigours of experimental verification.
APPENDIX A
Instructions to Subjects
The following screenshots represent all written instructions to the subjects.
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APPENDIX B
Language Families
The following tables show the raw data for each generation with a lan-
guage family. Items in green represent items that were seen by that gen-
eration. In order to work out what that generation was trained on, you
therefore must look to the left of a word highlighted in green.
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B.1 Pilot 1
Gen 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
poni poni poni poni tealawama tealawama tealawama tealawama
mowono lewene tealawama tealawama tealawama tealawama tealwama tealwama
wogumilo poni poni poni tealawama
kekiwe mahowawa poni poni tealawama tealawama
momogona momowa mahoha poni tealwama
puho momowa momowaha tealwama tealawama tealawama
pugune tealawama poni poni tealawama tealwama tealawama
luwilika pimilauke poni poni tealawama
wikegima teilauke tealwama tealawama poni poni poni hopa
nimewe lahowama lewene lewene lewene
miwukuke hemehe mahowaha mahawawa lewene
gewupolu hemehe mahowawa lewene lewene lewene
kawoha mewene lewene lewene lewene lewene
gili
weni mewene mahowawa mahowawa lewene lewene lewene
gage meheha meheha lewene lewene lewene lewene
hemeha meheha mahowawa lewene lewene lewene
pigu puoie meheha lewene lewene lewene lewene
popena mowama lewene tealwama mehehe tealwama tohowama tohowama wohawama
kilikope tealwama wohawama wohawama tealwama tealwama
giwe pilikaue mehehe tealwama tealwama tealwama
gakawu pilkaue lewene lewene tealwama tealwama
kigegake lewene mehehe tealwama tohawama tealawama
weku gemoma memeh mehehe tealwama tealwama
hiku tealwama tohowama tealawama tealawama hopiwama
wekuke milikaue mehehe tealwama wohawama tealawama tealwama
pehakigo milikaue mehehe mehehe tealwama tealwama tealwama
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B.2 Pilot 2
Gen 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
nakegama nakegama kini kepola kipola kepola kepola kepali kepali kepoli kepoli
kiki kini kihoni kipola kepola kepoli kepola kepali kepali kepoli kepoli
kipi kiki kiki kepola kepola kepola kepola kepali kepali kepoli kepola
nakenihi kini ninama kepola kahini kipola kepali kepali kepoli kepoli kepoli
hohiki gohina kihoni gilina kipola kipola kepoli kepali kepali kepoli namini
nikipi kehoni nanimi kini kipoli kepoli kepoli kepali kepali kepoli kepoli
nahiga piholic kini kini kipoli kepoli kepoli kepali kepali kepoli kepoli
kepi kinigama nihoni kini kipola kepoli nanimi kipola kepali namini namini
gake nakegama kiki kiki kipola kepoli kepali kepali kepali kepoli kepoli
hinikena kinali kipolic nanimi nanima nanima nanima nanimi nanimi namini namini
nahima namini kihoni nanimi nanima nanima nanima nanimi nanimi namini namini
ninahi nimali kihoni nanoma nanima nanima nanima nanima nanima namini namini
gahoni golini kipolic nanima nanimi nanimi nanimi nanimi nanimi namini namini
naniga hinima nanimi nanima nanimi nanimi nanimi nanimi nanimi namini namini
himahohi nanima nanimi nanima nanimi nanimi nanimi nanima nanima namini namini
kenihi pihoni kepoli nanimi nanimi nanimi nanimi nanimi nanimi namini namini
pihoma gohili kipolic nanima nanima nanimi nanimi nanimi nanimi namini namini
hikiga pihoni kihoni nanima nanimi nanimi nanimi nanima nanima namini namini
kini pikoli kini nahimi kepola kepola kepola kepola kepola kepola namini
nimaki kinipi gihoni kepola kipola kepoli kepola kipola kipola namini namini
nihi nanima namini kepola kepola kepola kepola kepola kepola kepola kepola
nakikema nakoli kihoni nanima kipola kepoli kepoli kepola kepola kepola namini
kinipi kehopi kipolic kahini kahini nanimi kepoli kipola kipola namini namini
honapini nanili kiholi kepoli kipola kipola kepola kepola kepola kepola kepola
kehoma kohipi nanima kahimi kepoli kepoli kepola kepola kepola kepola namini
hokehopi piholi nanima kahini kipol kepoli kipola kipola kipola kipoli namini
gahipihi gomali gilina kepoli kipola kipola kepola kepola kepola kepola kepola
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B.3 Family 1
Gen 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
kinimapi kimei hepini tuge tupim tupim minku miniku miniku miniku miniku
wikuki miwn miniku tupim tupim tupim miniku miniku miniku miniku miniku
kikumi miheniw hepini tupim tupim tupim miniku miniku miniku miniku miniku
miwiniku pemini nige miniku mihunu mihunu miniku miniku tupim tupim tupim
pinipi kupini tuge tuge tupim tupim tupin miniku tupim tupim tupim
kihemiwi pon mihenu mihunu miniku tupim tupim tupim tupim tupim tupim
miwimi poi poi poi poi miniku miniku miniku tupin tupin tupin
nipi mhip mpo tuge miniku tupim tupin tupin tupin tupin tupin
wige kuwpi tupim miniku miniku miniku tupin miniku tupin tupin tupin
nihepi mip nige tuge tuge tuge tuge tuge tuge tuge tuge
wigemi mpo nige tuge tuge tuge tuge tuge tuge tuge tuge
mahekuki miniku tuge tuge tuge tuge tuge tuge tuge tuge tuge
wimaku nige nige mihenu tuge tuge tuge tuge tuge tuge tuge
miniki miniku tuge tuge tuge tuge tuge tuge tuge tuge tuge
gepinini poh tuge tuge tuge tuge tuge tuge tuge tuge tuge
wikima tuge nige nige tuge tuge tuge tuge tuge tuge
nipikuge tuge tuge tuge tuge tuge tuge tuge tuge tuge tuge
hema weg mpo tuge tuge tuge tuge tuge tuge tuge tuge
pikuhemi kuhepi hepini tupim tupim tupim poi poi poi poi poi
kimaki wige tupim tupim tupim tupim poi poi poi poi poi
pimikihe mie tupim tupim tupim tupim poi poi poi poi poi
gepihemi hepinimi hepini mihenu tupim tupim poi poi poi poi poi
kunige himini miniku tupim tupim tupim tupin poi poi poi poi
miki hipe tupim tupim tupim tupim tupim tupim poi poi poi
mihe pobo nige poi poi poi poi poi poi poi poi
winige tupim tupim tupim tupim tupim tupin tupin poi poi poi
kinimage hipe poi tupim tupim tupim tupim poi poi poi poi
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B.4 Family 2
Gen 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
kawi minake gokame gomina gomina gomina gomina goina goina goina gomia
gopunena gomehoki gokame gomare gomina gomina gomina gomina gomina gomina gomina
hogona mihara gokame gomina gomina gomina gomina gomina gomina gomina gomina
pukakape honare honare honare honare honare honare honare horare horare horare
honemi honare honare honare honare honare honare honare honare honare honare
gopepuho gopuka honare honare honare honare honare honare honare honare honare
hokapumi kakawiha kakawi kakawi kakawi kakawi kakawi kakawi kakawi kakawa kakawa
nemiho kakawihe kakawi kakawi kakawi kakawi kakawi kakawa kakawa kakawa kakawa
kakawiho kakawiha kakawi kakawi kakawi kakawi kakawi kakawa kakawa kakawa kakawa
gokami gokare gokami gomia gomia gomia gomia gomia gomia gomia gomia
mina gokami mina gomina gomia gomia gomia honare honare horare horare
gomipe mina mina gomina gomia gomia gomia gomia gomia gomia gomina
goho goho goho goho honare honare honare honare honare horare horare
mipeho goho goho goho honare honare honare honare honare honare honare
pumi goho goho goho honare honare honare honare honare honare honare
napu puwa puwa puwa puwa puwa puwa kakawa kakawa kakawa kakawa
pena puwa puwa puwa kakawa kakawa kakawa kakawa kakawa kakawa kakawa
wipune wikame puwa puwa kakawa kakawa kakawa kakawa kakawa kakawa kakawa
pehomi gokami minare minare gomina goina goina gomina goina gomia gomia
mine minare minare minare gomina gomina gomina gomina gomina gomina gomina
pumihopu hokikapa minare minare gomina gomina gomina gomina gomina gomina gomina
miwinana honaka honaka horare honare honare horare horare horare horare horare
honaka honaka honake horare honare horare horare horare honare honare honare
negona honaka honake horare horare horare horare horare honare honare honare
naka kakawi kakawi kakawa kakawa kakawa kakawa kakawa kakawa kakawa kakawa
howimi mepumi kakawi kakawi kakawa kakawa kakawa kakawa kakawa kakawa kakawa
kahogo wikame kakawi kakawa kakawa kakawa kakawa kakawa kakawa kakawa kakawa
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B.5 Family 3
Gen 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
hekiha hekoha hekoha hekohi magohe megohe megohe magohe megome megoma megome
hekimu hekomu hekomu hekomu magomu megomu megomu megohe megohe megome megome
hekipo hekopo hekopo hehopo magopo wikipo wikipo wikipo magame haheke haheto
hegoha hegoha hegoha hekoha magohe megohe megohe megohe wikipu megohe magomo
hepimu hegomu hegomu hegoho magomu megomu megomu megomu megohe megohe magohe
hegopo hegopo hegopo hegipo magopo wikipo wikipo wikipo heheke hehake haheto
hehiha hehiha hehoha hehohi megohe magehe magohe magohe magahe megohe megomo
hehimu hehimu hehomu hehamu hegomu magemu hahemu magahe megohe megohe megohe
hehipo hehipo hehopo hehipo hagopo wikipo wikipo wikipo wikipo wikipu wikipo
wikiha wikiha wikoha wikohi magohe magohe magohe magahu haheke magohe megopu
wikimu wikipo wikomu wikomu makimu magomu megomu magohe magame magome megopu
wikipo wikipo wikipo wikopo makipo wikipo wikipo wikipo heheke hakeko hahepu
wigoha wigiha wigoha wihohi makihe magohe megohe haheku megemo wikipu magome
wigomu wigimu wigomu wikohe hahemu hahemu megomu megohe magame magepo magopu
wigopo wigipo wigipo wigopo wikipo wikipo wikipo wikipo heheke haheke hahepu
wihiha wikiha wihiha wihihe hahihe magohe magohe magahe wikipo magoma megoho
wihimu wihimu wihiha wihimu hahimu hahemu hahemu magahu megohe magome megoho
wihipo wihipo wihopo wihipo hakipo wikipo wikipo wikipo wikipo haheke wikipu
makiha makiha magoma magohe wihahe hahehe megohe megohu magahe megome magopu
makimu makimu makomu makomu mahimu magomu megomu megohe magame megohe megopu
makipo makipo magopo magopo wikipo wikipo wikipo wikipo heheke haheke haheki
magoha magoha magoma makohi makihe magohe magahe magohe magahe megome magoho
mapimu magimu magomu mahimu mahomu hahemu megomu magahe magame magome magohe
magopo magipo magipo mahopo hahopo wikipo wikipo wikipo wikipo wikipo hahepu
mahiha mahiha mahoha mahiho hegohe hahehe magohe megohe wikipo magope megoho
mahimu mahimu mahimu mahimu hegomu hahemu hahemu megohe megohe megome megohe
mahipo mahipo mahopo mahipo wikipo wikipo wikipo wikipo wikipo wikipo wikipo
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B.6 Family 4
Gen 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
ponowe ponowe ponowe ponowe ponowe ponowe ponowe ponowe lusawe posawe posawe
pononi pononi pononi ponoki pononi pononi pononi pononi posane posane posane
ponona ponona ponona ponona ponona ponona ponona ponona posona posana posana
pomewe pomewe pomewe pomewe pomewe pomewe pomiwe pomowe pomawe pomowe pomawe
pomeni pomeni pomeni pomeni pomeni pomeni pokiwe pononi pomane pomane pomane
pomena pomena pomena pomena pomena pomena pomina pomona pomana pomana pomana
pokiwe pokiwe pokinwe pokiwe pokiwe pokiwe pokiwe ponowe pokowe pokowe pokawe
pokini pokini pokini pokini pokini pokini pokini pokoni pokane pokane pokane
pokina pokina pokina pokini pokina pokina pokina pokena pokana pokana pokana
kanowe kanowe kanowe kanowe kanowe kanowe kinowe kusawa kasawe kasowe kasawe
kanoni kanoni kanoni kanoni kanoni kanoni kanoni kisene kasane kasane kasane
kanona kanona kanona kanona kanona kanona kanona kasona kanana kasana kasana
kamewe kamewe kamenwe kamewe kamewe kamewe kakawe kakawa kamowe kamowe kamawe
kameni kameni kameni kameni kameni kameni kamini kamoni kamane kamane kamane
kanona kamena kamena kanona kanona kamena kunona kisona kamana kamana kamana
kakiwe kakiwe kakina kakina kakiwe kakiwe kukiwe kakawe kakawe kakawe kakawe
kakini kakini kakina kakina kakini kakini kakine kukene kakane kakane kakane
kakina kakima kakina kakina kakini kakina kokina kasana kakana kakana kakana
lunowe lunona lunowe lunowe lunowe lunowe lunowe lunowe lusawe lusawe kasawe
lunoni lunoni lunoni lunoni lunoni lunoni lunoni lunone lusane lusane kasane
lunona lunona lunona lunona lunona lunona lunona lunona lusana lusana lasana
lumewe lumewe lumewe lumewe lumewe lumewe lukiwe lumowe lumawe lumowe lamawe
lumeni lumeni lumeni lumeni lumeni lumeni lukoni lunoni lumone lumane lamane
lumena lumena lumena lumena lumena lumena lumena lumoni kamana lumana lamana
lukiwe lukiwe lukinwe lukiwe luniwe lukiwe lukewe lukowe lukawe lukawe lakawe
lukini lukini lukini lukini lukini lukini lukoni lukoni lukane lukane lakane
lukina lukina lukina lukina lukina lukina lukana lukana lukana lukana lakana
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B.7 Family 5
Gen 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
huhunigu pikoku wikiko wikiko winekuki winekuki winikike winikiko wunkiko winikiko winikiko
kemuniwa huniki hukiki kunkuki kunkuki hunekuki honekiko honekiko kunkike hunekiko hunekiko
kihupo piko pokiko ponekuki ponekuki ponekuki punekiko ponekiko punkiko punekiko punekiko
wakiki wukiki winekiko winikiko winukuki winikuki winikeko winikiko winikiko winikiko winikiko
pokikehu ponuko kunikeko hunekuki hunekuki hunekuki kunekiko kunekiko ponekiko hunekiko hunekiko
waguhuki poku ponekiko ponekuki punekuki punikuki ponekiko punekiko pinkiko punkiko hunekiko
nihu kikiki kikiki winekiko wikekuki wanikuki winikiko winikiko winekiko winekiko punikiko
niguki hukeko hukiki kunekuki kunekuki kunikuki kunekiko kikekiko pinekiko ponikiko winikike
koni koni ponekiko ponekiko ponekuki punekuki punekiko punikiko punkiko punkiko punkiko
muwapo wuniki wineko wineko wineko wineke wineke wineke wuneke winekike punike
powa pinokiki huneko kuneko kuneko kunike honeke honeke kineke hunike wineke
hukinimu kuniko ponukeko poneko poneko ponike punike ponike puneke punike winikike
wako wako wikeko wineko wuneko wanike wineke winike wineke winike puneke
hukeko ponikio huniko huneko huneko hunike kuneke kuneke huneke ponike hunekike
pohumu hukeko ponekuko poneko puneko punike punike puneke puneke ponike punike
muko wakiki kineko wineki wikeko wineke wineke winike wunike winike wineke
kokeguke piniko kuneko kuneko kuneko hunike kuneke punike honike huneke wineke
kimu koniki pokiko poneko poneko punike punikiko punike punike ponike wineke
kekewa wiki wiki wikiko winekiko winikike winikeke winekike winikike winike winekike
komuhuke ponukiko huki kunekuki kunkiko kunikike honekiko honekike kinike ponike hunikike
kopo ponikiko poniki poneko pokiko punikike punekike ponikike poneike ponike punikiki
huwa ponikiko wineko wikuki winekiko winekiko winikike winekike winike winikike winikike
hukike hukeke hunekiki hunekiko hunekiko kunike kunekike kunekike kinkike hunike punkike
ponikiko ponikiko ponekuki poneki puniko punekiko punikike punekike punkike ponike punikike
kowagu winiko wineki winuki wikiko wanikike winikike winkike winkeke winike winikike
kokihuko hukiki hunekiko hunekiko kunekiko kunekike kinekike kinekike honkike huneke winike
kiwanike kuniko pokiko ponekuki pokiko punikike ponekiko ponekiko pinkike punike winikike
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B.8 Family 6
Gen 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
pawamu gopumi wima gepoko pygamo gemugo mygempo vimugo vimugame vinegame pogem
gopeko peko pakoke gemegame winugame pogame mypemgo penegame penegame pinegame pogame
muke pakoke wima gepemy gymugo myugo pemugame pegame pegame pagame pinegame
gokokoni gopawe wimegamu gegogo gemegame penegame penegame vimugo vimugame vinegame vinegame
pewakeni pumewiwa penigamu gegumy gemegame pegame pygempo gepgo penegame vinegame vinegame
pakoke gopoke kamigamu wamugamy gemegame pegame pemugo pegepgo pegepgo pegom vinegame
kope wunigamu wunigamu winugame winugame winugame winugame vimugame vimogame vimegame pinegame
wako wamu wamu pegamy winugame winugame winugo vimugo penegame gempo gempo
wikewape pewawe pakoke winugame penegame penegame mypego vimugo pegame pinegame vimegame
niwapake wima pago pagumy gemgo gemgo gego mypego mipego mygamma gemco
keko pawikako pagamu gego gego gego pemugo migypgo mypeg gemco gemco
niwa pawame gopawe gego pape gemgo pemgy pego pe miopy gemco
gowi wingumi kego keko gego pape pape migypgo mipeggo pegym pogem
pawani pewu pakoke gupumy gopoko pape pemgo gepgo penego pegym pegem
gopawa pamuwawi pape pape pape pape gemgo pegypgo pego miopy vimugo
pamu wima gopumi gupogp pape gego memgo mygo vimugo pe pogem
panimu pagake gopumi gego pape gemgo mepegy gemgo gemgo pe pegem
pamugo pumago pumago gepego pape gemgo mypego pe pe pe pe
muniwiwa kewi kewi penegame gepego mipegy mypegy mygemgo vimugo vimugo vimugo
kewi piwawe pagamu gukepo gepego mipeg mipego migepgo mypeggo mipogy pogem
pani pumikako panigamu pogumy mipego mipego mipego mipego mipego migemco vimugo
wimu kewi gopoke keko gepmy pegamy gepmy migemgo mypeggo mygamma vimugo
mukepa pape kegami kegopo pogomy gepmy pemgy gepgo penego miogy vimugo
kepewipa winipawe wimigamu gewugo pegamy gepamy pemygo pegepgo mipeggo miopy migemco
munikego kewi kewi gepogame mepegy mypegy mypegy mygepgo vimugo miopy miope
pape kewi winugami penegame gopomy mipegy mipegy gemgo penego miope miopy
niwipa pumi wigamu gemugo pogumy pogomy mypegy mygepgo mipego pygypo miope
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